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INTRODUCTION 
From the beginning, American slavery was essentially internation-
al, a product of the Atlantic slave trade; and so, too, was the abolitionist 
movement, with its roots in Great Britain. It therefore comes as a surprise 
that the Thirteenth Amendment is jurisdictionally restricted to abolishing 
slavery “within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdic-
tion.”1 The self-executing provisions of the Amendment, found in Sec-
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 1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. 
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tion 1, do not extend overseas.2 That leaves the possibility that the en-
forcement provisions in Section 2, giving Congress the “power to en-
force this article by appropriate legislation,” authorize extraterritorial 
legislation.3 Yet this conclusion by no means follows from the language 
of the Amendment, which authorizes legislation under Section 2 as a 
means for achieving the ends defined in Section 1. How can the geo-
graphical scope of enforcement possibly exceed the prohibition to be 
enforced?4 This question involves more than explicating the text of two 
clauses in the Constitution. And it requires approaches more persuasive 
than simply updating the Constitution by editing out disturbing language 
with modern interpretive techniques. 
Congress might decide to regulate or punish slavery overseas for a 
number of reasons, and it has enacted surprisingly broad prohibitions to 
this effect. Because of competition with domestic products and services, 
slavery overseas could undermine the entire regime of free labor that the 
Thirteenth Amendment sought to constitutionalize. Slave labor in other 
countries has the potential to drive employers of free labor in this country 
out of business. Free labor in the United States also faces the threat of 
competition from slave labor brought into this country through human 
trafficking. International enforcement of prohibitions against slavery and 
trafficking remains, practically and morally, a necessary condition of 
safeguarding free labor in this country. This is not to say that national 
abolition must await worldwide abolition, which remains a disturbingly 
distant goal. Nonetheless, neither the transnational effects of the global 
economy, nor the universal imperatives of human rights—of which free-
dom from slavery constitutes the most salient example—can be ignored. 
This Article examines the resources available under American law 
to address the issues raised by extraterritorial enforcement of one of the 
most widely recognized human rights—to be free from physical coercion 
and the loss of liberty. Part I reviews the history of adoption, interpreta-
tion, and enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment. The scope of the 
Amendment gradually expanded through the joint efforts of Congress 
and the Supreme Court, resulting in a prohibition that now goes beyond 
involuntary servitude to all forms of peonage, whether supported by state 
or private action. Part II then looks to other sources of congressional 
power—the Commerce Clause, the Define and Punish Clause, and the 
Treaty Power—and analyzes how these clauses interact with the power 
                                                     
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. § 2. 
 4. For an attempt to directly expand the interpreted scope of the Thirteenth Amendment, see 
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COLUM. L. REV. 973 (2002). 
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to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment. These sources of congressional 
power are subject, at most, to the minimal constraint that any resulting 
law regulate activity that has something to do with the United States—
that American law have something to do with actions or effects within 
this country, as seemingly required by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. Taken together, the powers of Congress give it ample 
scope to enact any law realistically designed to prevent or remedy slav-
ery overseas. Part III then looks at slavery in the modern world and ex-
amines how far it extends beyond historic forms of chattel slavery to oth-
er coercive and oppressive conditions of employment. As periodic re-
ports by international organizations make clear, these now include a va-
riety of forms of forced labor and human trafficking.5 Whether prohibi-
tions against slavery should extend further to reach labor conditions that 
would not be tolerated in this country turns out to be a practical question 
of law enforcement and foreign relations, rather than a question of con-
gressional power. The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the 
choice between narrower and broader efforts to enforce prohibitions 
against slavery overseas. 
I. ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 
The geographical limit expressed in the Thirteenth Amendment de-
rives, as does the Amendment itself, from the Northwest Ordinance. The 
ordinance dates from the founding era, when it was enacted by the Con-
tinental Congress and then reenacted by the First Congress under the 
Constitution. It provided that “[t]here shall be neither slavery nor invol-
untary servitude in the said territory,” referring to the Northwest Territo-
ry comprising what are now the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Wisconsin, and part of Minnesota.6 Later legislation, such as the 
Missouri Compromise7 and the Kansas-Nebraska Act,8 also incorporated 
geographical restrictions as a result of compromises between the free 
states and the slave states. The same pattern continued during the Civil 
War in statutes prohibiting slavery within the District of Columbia and in 
the Territories.9 The Emancipation Proclamation also had geographical 
restrictions, mainly designed to maintain the allegiance of the border 
states.10 Those restrictions derived from the exigencies of war and the 
related limits on the power of the President as Commander in Chief, 
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which meant that abolition could only be achieved in areas of the South 
controlled by the Union Army.11 
As the Civil War came to a close, the Thirteenth Amendment came 
up for consideration by Congress, which deliberately chose to model the 
Amendment on the terms of the Northwest Ordinance. Congress simply 
substituted the phrase “within the United States, or any place subject to 
their jurisdiction” for the phrase in the ordinance, “within said territory.” 
Confining the geographical scope of the Amendment fit the temper of the 
times and prevailing notions of sovereignty. Nation states with exclusive 
territorial jurisdiction formed the unquestioned basis for international law 
and raised few problems in foreign relations. The leading treatise on pri-
vate international law, Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Conflict of 
Laws, took as fundamental the mutually exclusive territorial allocation of 
national power.12 As paraphrased in the well-known decision in Pennoy-
er v. Neff,13 handed down only a few years after ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, “the laws of one State have no operation outside of 
its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity.”14 Over the course of 
the twentieth century, the principle of exclusive territorial sovereignty 
steadily eroded as protection for human rights expanded. Other grounds 
for asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction expanded at the same time, such 
as “passive personality jurisdiction” over crimes against state citizens 
committed overseas.15 Nations assumed obligations under international 
law to their own citizens, which made them vulnerable to enforcement 
actions by other nations or by international institutions.16 The question 
before us in the twenty-first century is how strictly we should follow the 
principle of territorial sovereignty from the nineteenth century. 
In other respects, the Thirteenth Amendment has received expan-
sive interpretations endorsed by both Congress and the Supreme Court, 
which might also support expanded geographical coverage. Beginning 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1866,17 Congress interpreted its powers un-
der Section 2 of the Amendment to extend well beyond imposing penal-
ties for slavery. The Act purported to confer citizenship on the newly 
freed slaves and to give them the same civil rights as “enjoyed by white 
                                                     
 11. For a summary of these developments, see George Rutherglen, State Action, Private Ac-
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 12. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN 
REGARD TO CONTRACTS, RIGHTS AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES, 
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 13. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
 14. Id. at 722. 
 15. ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF NATIONS 247–55 (7th ed. 2012). 
 16. Id. at 120–27. 
 17. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, 14 Stat. 27 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981–1982 (2012)). 
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citizens.”18 Although the constitutionality of this Act came into question, 
the issue was resolved by passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
followed the Act in granting citizenship to former slaves and protecting 
the civil rights of citizens.19 In the Peonage Act of 1867,20 Congress ac-
complished a similar, but less dramatic, extension of the Thirteenth 
Amendment. While the Amendment prohibits only slavery and involun-
tary servitude, the Peonage Act prohibits voluntary as well as involuntary 
servitude, putting an end to the practice of indentures for a term of years 
in repayment for a debt or other obligation.21 The Peonage Act also pro-
hibits any form of debt bondage—in the sense of an obligation to work 
until a debt has been paid off—without the option of quitting and leaving 
the debt unpaid.22 
The line of cases upholding the Peonage Act confirmed a second 
extension of the Thirteenth Amendment, from public action to private 
action. Individual justices had reached this conclusion in decisions on 
circuit,23 and the Supreme Court had endorsed it in dictum in the Civil 
Rights Cases.24 The first holding to this effect came in a peonage prose-
cution brought against private individuals without any involvement by 
the state.25 This decision confirmed that the “state action” doctrine under 
the Fourteenth Amendment had no inherent restraining influence on the 
Thirteenth Amendment or on legislation passed to enforce its terms.26 
For this reason, the Supreme Court interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 as a statute enacted under the Thirteenth Amendment, despite its 
convergence with the Fourteenth Amendment, in order to cover private 
discrimination on the basis of race.27 
The expansion of the Thirteenth Amendment along these two di-
mensions—beyond slavery and involuntary servitude and beyond state 
action—suggests that it might also extend beyond the territorial bounda-
ries of the United States. Although Section 1 only abolishes slavery 
“within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction,” the 
                                                     
 18. Id. § 1. 
 19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a summary of these developments, see George Ruther-
glen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio Still Bemused and Confused, 55 SUP. CT. REV. 
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 20. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 187, 14 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1581 
(2012)). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (2012). 
 22. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 242 (1911). 
 23. In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337 (Chase, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247); Ar-
thur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 318 (Harlan, Circuit Justice, 7th Cir. 1894). 
 24. 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). 
 25. Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905). 
 26. Id. at 216–18. 
 27. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
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enforcement provisions of Section 2 contain no explicit territorial limit. 
Can Congress legislate against slavery overseas? As will become clear in 
the next Part of this Article, Congress need not rely only on Section 2 to 
achieve this objective. But neither can it ignore the terms of Section 1. 
The great antislavery principles of the Thirteenth Amendment must be 
implemented consistently with the territorial restrictions expressed in the 
Amendment and widely accepted at the time. Those restrictions may be 
dismaying today and subject to exploitation—as was the exception for 
convict labor—but they must be taken seriously nonetheless. 
The geographical restriction in Section 1 contrasts oddly with the 
arguments offered for passage of the Thirteenth Amendment, which were 
based on natural law. These arguments began from the premise that slav-
ery could exist only as the creature of positive law, enacted by a state or 
nation. Stephen Douglas took this position in the Lincoln-Douglas De-
bates,28 and it can be traced back to Roman law. Under the influence of 
Stoic philosophy, the Romans distinguished between ius naturale (natu-
ral law), which prohibited slavery, and ius gentium (the prevailing law of 
people everywhere), which permitted slavery.29 All sides seemed to agree 
that what could be established by positive law could be repealed by posi-
tive law—abolitionists because the slavery could exist only if regulated 
by positive law, and their opponents because it was a local issue to be 
resolved by each state.30 Supporters of the Amendment, like other aboli-
tionists before them, took this argument one step further and denied the 
validity of any enacted law that contradicted natural law. As Representa-
tive Farnsworth, a Republican from Illinois, argued in the debates over 
the Amendment: “‘Property!’ What is property? That is property which 
the Almighty made property. When at the creation He gave man domin-
ion over things animate and inanimate, He established property. No-
where do you read that He gave man dominion over another man.”31 The 
universal moral argument against slavery, once accepted, seemed to dic-
tate universal coverage of the Thirteenth Amendment. If slavery was al-
ways and everywhere immoral, then the prohibition against slavery 
should be equally broad. 
Universal abolition did not, however, come to fruition. Instead, the 
historical precedents of abolitionist legislation and the dominant territori-
al conceptions of sovereignty determined the coverage of the Thirteenth 
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 29. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 55 (1962). 
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COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 35–36 (2013). 
 31. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 200 (1865); see also CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1437–38 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Harlan); id. at 1481 (remarks of Sen. Sumner). 
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Amendment. Section 1 imposes explicit territorial limits on the scope of 
the Amendment. Section 2 is not quite so clear, but it is limited to en-
forcement of “this article.” Conceivably, that might justify extension of 
coverage to the high seas and to individuals held in bondage for transit to 
the United States. Statutes prohibiting slavery in these circumstances 
might be classified as “appropriate legislation,” in the sense of a permis-
sible means to the legitimate end of preventing slavery in this country. 
Imaginative reconstruction of the Amendment along these lines, howev-
er, gradually shifts the focus of argument to other clauses in the Constitu-
tion, such as the Commerce Clause. The force of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, as an independent source of congressional power, gives way to 
interpretation of other sources of power in light of the Amendment. The 
antislavery principles embodied in the Amendment exert influence be-
yond the literal terms of the Amendment itself. 
The text of the Amendment does not purport to limit Congress in its 
exercise of other powers for abolitionist ends. Nor does anything in the 
Amendment’s history suggest a similar limitation. Like the other Recon-
struction amendments, the Thirteenth Amendment attracted criticism 
only for the opposite reason: that it greatly expanded the power of the 
federal government at the expense of the states.32 Nor has the Supreme 
Court generally accepted the argument that restraints on one grant of 
congressional power support similar restrictions on another.33 Any effort 
to extend the territorial restrictions in the Thirteenth Amendment comes 
up against the absence of any such restrictions in other clauses. The 
clauses most likely to support legislation against slavery expressly or 
impliedly contemplate the possibility of federal law reaching overseas: 
the Commerce Power, insofar as it authorizes regulation of “Commerce 
with foreign Nations”; the Define and Punish Clause, which extends to 
“Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against 
the Law of Nations”; and the Treaty Power, which inherently involves 
foreign nations.34 The Thirteenth Amendment bears on interpretation of 
these clauses in a wholly positive way, by making the abolition of slav-
ery a legitimate end of appropriate federal legislation.35 The next Part of 
this Article turns specifically to these clauses. 
                                                     
 32. Rutherglen, supra note 11, at 1380–82. 
 33. See Thomas B. Nachbar, Intellectual Property and Constitutional Norms, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 272, 280–318 (2004). Only one decision, invalidating legislation under the Commerce Clause 
that violated the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, imports restrictions from one 
power granted to Congress in the Constitution to another power. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n v. Gibbons, 
455 U.S. 457 (1982). 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, cl. 10; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 35. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819). 
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II. COMMERCE, TREATIES, AND VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. The Power to Regulate “Commerce with Foreign Nations” 
Long before the nearly plenary power of Congress to regulate 
commerce became accepted as constitutional in the New Deal—in fact, 
long before the Thirteenth Amendment became part of the Constitu-
tion—Congress regulated the slave trade as a form of international com-
merce. At the earliest possible moment, Congress prohibited the interna-
tional slave trade in terms that reached all the way to the shores of Afri-
ca. In a provision that could not itself be amended, the original Constitu-
tion prohibited any legislation against the importation of slaves before 
1808.36 By prohibiting any earlier legislation, the Constitution tacitly 
admitted the power of Congress to pass later legislation. When it did so 
in the Act of March 2, 1807,37 the prohibitions took effect on January 1, 
1808. Although most sections of the Act were concerned with the slave 
trade to the United States, one section prohibited vessels from taking on 
board any “negro, mulatto, or person of colour” for transport “to any port 
or place whatsoever, for the purpose of selling or disposing of the same 
as a slave, or with intent that the same may be sold or disposed of to be 
held to service or labour.”38 
Although this legislation encountered strident opposition from 
southern legislators, their objections focused on congressional power 
over the interstate slave trade, exactly the opposite of the current disputes 
over the extraterritorial application of federal law on other subjects. To 
this day, federal laws against slavery and peonage assert universal juris-
diction to stamp out these practices. For example, federal criminal law 
contains a prohibition that applies worldwide to “[w]hoever knowingly 
and willfully holds to involuntary servitude or sells into any condition of 
involuntary servitude, any other person for any term, or brings within the 
United States any person so held.”39 The territorial restriction in the sec-
ond clause, concerned with importation of slaves into the United States, 
implies the absence of any such restriction on the first clause, concerned 
with holding and selling slaves. Congress confirmed this conclusion in 
2008 with legislation specifically addressing extraterritorial jurisdiction 
over criminal prosecutions for violation of this and other prohibitions 
against slavery and peonage.40 
                                                     
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 37. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, ch. 22, 2 Stat. 426. 
 38. Id. § 8. 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 1584 (2012). 
 40. Id. § 1596. 
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Extraterritorial legislation against slavery dates back to the eight-
eenth century, based on congressional power to prohibit American partic-
ipation in the slave trade between other countries or in the export of 
slaves from this country.41 This legislation fell outside the 1808 Clause, 
which applied only to the importation of slaves. In an opinion by Chief 
Justice Taney, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction under this statute 
of an American captain of an American slave-trading vessel seized on its 
outward voyage to Africa to pick up slaves for transport to a third coun-
try.42 Like the debate over the 1807 Act, this decision has the ironic im-
plication that the fewer the contacts of the case with the United States, 
the more likely it was presumed to be constitutional. In Morris, the Su-
preme Court expressed no doubt about the constitutionality of the prohi-
bition and its extraterritorial reach.43 The Court took the same view of the 
cases, collectively known as The Slavers,44 decided during the Civil War. 
Those cases concerned the seizure of American vessels outfitted for the 
slave trade, again between third countries, and again decided without 
questioning the constitutionality of the underlying statutes. 
A few modern decisions have taken this extra step and expressed 
doubt about the extraterritorial application of the laws against slavery, 
but only insofar as they support private rights of action. In John Roe I v. 
Bridgestone Corp.,45 the district court held that the prohibition against 
forced labor in 18 U.S.C. § 1589 did not reach conditions of employment 
in Liberia. Although framed in nominally universal terms, the statute did 
not expressly apply overseas, unlike several related prohibitions against 
slavery.46 Another district court reached a similar conclusion, denying a 
private right of action for violations of § 1589 and related provisions.47 
The enactment of § 159648 undermines both decisions because it explicit-
ly extends criminal jurisdiction to overseas violations of § 1589, but no 
similar provision extends civil jurisdiction to private actions. Internation-
al law has long recognized universal jurisdiction to punish crimes “gen-
erally accepted as an attack upon the international order,” such as piracy 
                                                     
 41. Act of Mar. 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 347; Act of May 10, 1800, ch. 51, 2 Stat. 70. 
 42. United States v. Morris, 39 U.S. 464, 474 (1840). 
 43. Id. at 474–77. 
 44. The Slavers (Kate), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 350 (1864); The Slavers (Sarah), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 
366 (1864); The Slavers (Weathergage), 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 375 (1864); The Slavers (Reindeer), 69 
U.S. (2 Wall.) 383 (1864). 
 45. 492 F. Supp. 2d 988 (S.D. Ind. 2007), aff’d on other grounds, 643 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 
2011). 
 46. Id. at 1002–03. 
 47. Nattah v. Bush, 541 F. Supp. 2d 223, 234–35 (D.D.C. 2008), aff’d in relevant part, 605 
F.3d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 48. 18 U.S.C. § 1596 (2012). 
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and slavery.49 Civil jurisdiction has proven to be more controversial and 
few states recognize it, with the notable exception of the United States in 
the Alien Tort Statute.50 
Whether or not this distinction between criminal and civil jurisdic-
tion holds up in international law, it does not fit well with constitutional 
decisions on the scope of congressional power. Since the New Deal, the 
Commerce Clause has received an exceedingly broad interpretation, in-
terrupted only by the occasional decision imposing some limits on con-
gressional power. Most recently, five Justices in National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius51 opined that the Commerce Clause did 
not extend to coercing private parties to engage in commerce, in the form 
of forcing them to buy health insurance. But because that case largely 
upheld the Affordable Care Act on other grounds, the opinion of these 
Justices could be dismissed as dicta. Whether or not it is, this limitation 
on the Commerce Clause has few implications for extraterritorial appli-
cation of the prohibitions against slavery. The same is true of other limit-
ing decisions under the Commerce Clause. These decisions cover such 
topics as regulating handguns near schools, whether or not they have 
been shipped in interstate commerce, and providing a civil remedy for 
violence against women, regardless of its relationship to commerce.52 
Even these decisions affirm the power of Congress to regulate the chan-
nels of commerce, the instrumentalities of commerce, and “activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”53 
Constraints on extraterritorial coverage, such as they are, derive 
from principles of statutory interpretation rather than the Constitution 
itself, primarily in the form of the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
If anything, the power of Congress over international commerce exceeds 
its power over interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has twice made 
statements to this effect, although not as part of an explicit holding. In 
Champion v. Ames,54 the Supreme Court distinguished the two forms of 
congressional power over commerce based on the absence of a reserved 
power of the states over international commerce. The Court reasoned: 
[The Commerce Clause] clothed Congress with that power over in-
ternational commerce, pertaining to a sovereign nation in its inter-
                                                     
 49. JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 467–68 (8th 
ed. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 404 (1986). 
 50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); CRAWFORD, supra note 49, at 475–76. 
 51. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 52. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 
(2000). 
 53. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. 
 54. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). 
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course with foreign nations, and subject, generally speaking, to no 
implied or reserved power in the states. The laws which would be 
necessary and proper in the one case would not be necessary or 
proper in the other.55 
The Court has more recently opined that, as compared to the power over 
interstate commerce, “there is evidence that the Founders intended the 
scope of the foreign commerce power to be the greater.”56 Lower courts 
have occasionally taken up this reasoning.57 But it need not be pressed to 
its limits to support application of a nearly universal scope to laws 
against slavery and the slave trade. Other sources of congressional pow-
er, to be discussed shortly, can fill the gaps left by the Commerce 
Clause.58 
Those gaps arise from the difficulty of ascertaining, in the abstract, 
the effects that labor practices in other countries have on American 
commerce, either with that country or within this country. Those practic-
es might have either isolated or pervasive effects. The longstanding pro-
hibitions against commerce in goods produced by slave labor focus upon 
articles in interstate or international commerce, which have an independ-
ent basis in Commerce Clause doctrine.59 Prohibiting slavery in other 
countries because of its effects on American commerce does not stand on 
the same secure footing. Slavery in other countries must “substantially 
affect” American commerce,60 which depends on the nature of the goods 
or services produced by slave labor. Forced prostitution in rural villages 
in Asia, for instance, does not have any obvious effects on commerce 
outside that country, while forced prostitution in Bangkok, which has 
been a center of “sex tourism,” has a much stronger connection to Amer-
ican commerce.61 The chain of causal connections might be long or short, 
but it must result in an overall probability of a significant effect on 
American commerce. The argument for extraterritorial coverage under 
the Commerce Clause turns on the facts of each case, and therefore rein-
forces the practical incentive to limit prosecution to cases with stronger 
                                                     
 55. Id. at 373. 
 56. Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979). 
 57. Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 967–68 
(2010). 
 58. See infra Parts II.B–C. 
 59. Ashurst–Sumners Act, Pub. L. No. 74-215, 49 Stat. 494 (1935) (codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 1761–1762 (2012)). 
 60. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563. 
 61. See Sara K. Andrews, Comment, U.S. Domestic Prosecution of the American International 
Sex Tourist: Efforts to Protect Children from Sexual Exploitation, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
415 (2004). 
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ties to the United States. Other sources of congressional power, while 
different in theory, have much the same effect in practice. 
B. The Power “To Make Treaties” 
The Constitution confers on the President the power, “by and with 
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur.”62 This clause contains no inherent 
limit on the subject of a treaty, or on legislation that might be passed to 
implement it under the Necessary and Proper Clause. The absence of 
express limits on the Treaty Power has led some to conclude that it has 
no limits. The Supreme Court, for instance, has never struck down a trea-
ty on the ground that it exceeds congressional power. Justice Holmes 
might have taken this view in his opinion for the Court in Missouri v. 
Holland,63 which upheld legislation to implement the Migratory Bird 
Treaty Act of 1918. He pointed out that “[t]he treaty in question does not 
contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The 
only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from 
the general terms of the Tenth Amendment.”64 But the Tenth Amend-
ment—which reserves to the states powers not granted to the federal 
government—did not come into play because the states themselves were 
powerless to protect migratory birds that only temporarily came within 
their boundaries. 
Justice Holmes’s reasoning suggests the existence of additional lim-
its on the Treaty Power based on general concerns of federalism and state 
sovereignty. Those limits, whatever they are, look inward rather than 
outward, however. They do not support constraints on the Treaty Power 
insofar as it operates outside, rather than inside, this country. The recent 
decision in Bond v. United States65 expresses such concerns, but as a 
matter of statutory interpretation rather than constitutional limits. That 
case arose from a prosecution for using “chemical weapons” in violation 
of federal legislation implementing the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on Their Destruction.66 The Court narrowly interpreted the phrase 
“chemical weapon” so that it did not include the chemical used by the 
defendant, which was not a chemical weapon within the ordinary mean-
                                                     
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 63. 252 U.S. 416 (1920). 
 64. Id. at 433–34. 
 65. 134 S. Ct. 2077 (2014). 
 66. Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chem-
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ing of the term.67 The Court expressed reluctance to make “a federal 
case” out of these events, all of which occurred as part of a marital dis-
pute in a small suburb of Philadelphia.68 To hold otherwise, the Court 
reasoned, would intrude too deeply into state control over routine crimi-
nal law enforcement, in the absence of “a clear indication that Congress 
meant to reach purely local crimes.”69 
By this means, the Court therefore avoided the constitutional ques-
tion in the case, not whether the convention was a valid treaty—all sides 
conceded that it was—but whether the implementing statute was valid. 
That question divided the majority from the dissenters. The latter would 
have held that the statute clearly prohibited the conduct in question, but 
they nevertheless concluded that the statute was invalid under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause because it did not aid in making the treaty but 
only in implementing it.70 The dissenters rejected the line from Missouri 
v. Holland, which Justice Holmes made almost in passing: “If the treaty 
is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under 
Article I, Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the pow-
ers of the Government.”71 For the dissenters, any implementing legisla-
tion had to find a source in some other power granted to Congress. They 
worried that without this restriction, the Necessary and Proper Clause 
could operate with the Treaty Power to confer plenary power on the fed-
eral government at the expense of the states.72 
On the facts of the case, those worries made some sense, as evi-
denced by the majority’s willingness to artificially narrow the statute to 
avoid assessing its constitutionality. In an extraterritorial case, the dis-
senters would also force Congress to seek authority in other clauses of 
the Constitution for legislation prohibiting the possession or use of chem-
ical weapons. The clauses relating to the armed forces would be suffi-
cient to justify legislation regulating the federal government’s own use of 
chemical weapons, but prohibitions against third parties would have their 
most plausible sources in the Commerce Clause and the Define and Pun-
ish Clause. Under the former, transport of chemical weapons in com-
merce or their effects on commerce could be subject to prohibition. Un-
der the latter, the convention itself could be taken to be part of the “Law 
of Nations” and the use and possession of chemical weapons “Offences” 
                                                     
 67. Bond, 134 S. Ct. at 2091. 
 68. Id. at 2094. 
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that could be punished by Congress. Such a search for other sources in 
the Constitution, rather than in international law, seems to take the long 
way around for justifying implementing legislation.73 If anything, the 
dissenters invert the relationship between the treaty power and appropri-
ate legislation, requiring the former to supplement the latter as means to 
an end specified in some other power in the Constitution. The dissenters 
do, however, tacitly concede that the powers conferred on Congress are 
mutually supporting. Where one power might be doubted, another usual-
ly can be invoked in its place. One power can supplement another in 
more subtle ways, not by “invisible radiation,” to use Holmes’s phrase,74 
but by legitimating the ends that a statute serves or obviating objections 
to its terms. 
Federalism objections to legislation over slavery lost their force af-
ter ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. The same holds true of ob-
jections to the treaties against slavery, to which the United States became 
a party over the course of the twentieth century. With a single exception, 
the United States has ratified all the major international agreements on 
slavery and trafficking: the Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Simi-
lar Institutions and Practices Convention of 1926;75 the United Nations 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, 
and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1956;76 and the Unit-
ed Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Per-
sons, Especially Women and Children of 2000.77 Only one comparably 
broad prohibition against slavery, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,78 has failed to be ratified by the United States. That trea-
ty established the International Criminal Court, which elicited strong ob-
jections on other grounds based on the court’s potential jurisdiction over 
American military personnel serving overseas. 
                                                     
 73. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland & William S. Dodge, Defining and Punishing Offenses Under 
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 74. Holland, 252 U.S. at 434. 
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The treaties that the United States has ratified reinforce the overseas 
coverage of the federal prohibitions against slavery as necessary imple-
menting legislation. Any challenge to such legislation would have to rec-
ognize the inability of the states to address this problem themselves, be-
cause the states are forbidden from entering into treaties.79 The states 
cannot coordinate their actions with foreign nations in the absence of an 
international agreement made by the federal government. Just as in Mis-
souri v. Holland, federal action is necessary because state action is im-
possible; either it is too narrow to be effective or too broad to be valid on 
its own. Federal action against slavery also has the historical pedigree of 
federal legislation against the slave trade dating back to the eighteenth 
century. Because American slavery began as a transnational problem, it 
has to be addressed as one. Initially, Congress did so as part of its power 
to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of commerce. It can do so 
with more certain authority under the Treaty Power. 
C. “To Define and Punish” 
From the beginning, the Constitution granted Congress the power 
“[t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high 
Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”80 The first part of the 
clause overlaps and coincides with federal subject matter jurisdiction 
over “all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.”81 The high seas, 
by definition, exclude state territorial waters. Under current law, the high 
seas generally begin twelve nautical miles from American shores and end 
twelve nautical miles away from foreign shores.82 Congressional power 
might well go further under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and stat-
utes prohibiting slavery have historically reached into the territorial wa-
ters of American states and foreign nations, as has admiralty jurisdiction. 
Section 4 of the 1807 Act, for instance, makes it illegal for any citizen or 
resident of the United States to “take on board, receive or transport from 
any of the coasts or kingdoms of Africa, or from any other foreign king-
dom, place, or country, any negro, mulatto, or person of colour, in any 
ship or vessel” in order to be sold or to serve as a slave in the United 
States.83 The statute’s coverage goes right up to the coastline of Africa. 
Presumably it did so to facilitate enforcement because vessels could 
                                                     
 79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 80. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. 
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more easily be seized, and perpetrators more easily prosecuted, while the 
vessels were in port. 
The remainder of the Define and Punish Clause covers “Offences 
against the Law of Nations.” This provision has no geographical re-
strictions, which might reflect the Framers’ focus on the deficiencies of 
state law in protecting foreign officials, citizens, and subjects.84 Accepted 
territorial conceptions of sovereignty at the time might well have exclud-
ed extraterritorial coverage from consideration, as they did with the Thir-
teenth Amendment and its express territorial limits. The altered concep-
tions of sovereignty today, particularly to accommodate the growing 
recognition of human rights, have made international law a more power-
ful force for imposing obligations upon a sovereign within its own bor-
ders. So, too, has the increasing acceptance of universal jurisdiction over 
crimes such as terrorism and genocide. An interpretation of the Define 
and Punish Clause that takes account of these developments could readi-
ly justify extraterritorial legislation. 
The course of judicial decisions, however, has been far more grudg-
ing. The Supreme Court’s only decision on what constitutes “Offences 
against the Law of Nations” upheld a conviction for counterfeiting for-
eign currency within this country. In United States v. Arjona,85 the Court 
reasoned that international law “requires every national government to 
use ‘due diligence’ to prevent a wrong being done within its own domin-
ion to another nation with which it is at peace.”86 In the single modern 
case in which the United States relied upon the clause to give extraterri-
torial effect to legislation, it failed. In United States v. Bellaizac-
Hurtado,87 the Eleventh Circuit reversed a conviction for drug trafficking 
in the territorial waters of Panama. The court construed the “Law of Na-
tions” to include only customary international law and found no consen-
sus against drug trafficking in the actual practice of other nations.88 The 
court discounted the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,89 despite the fact 
that it had been ratified by 188 nations, including the United States. En-
forcement of antidrug laws, the court found, has been highly uneven.90 
True though that may be, such reasoning neglects the force of the 
political judgment behind the acceptance of the U.N. Convention. In the 
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2016] The Constitution and Slavery Overseas 711 
United States, as in most nations, accession to a treaty represents the po-
litical recognition of an obligation, even if it is observed frequently in the 
breach. If the “Law of Nations” cannot be shaped by international 
agreements, it has little capacity to develop in a fashion acceptable to the 
politically responsible branches of government, here and abroad, that 
negotiate and ratify such agreements.91 The court in Bellaizac-Hurtado 
seemed motivated less by a considered judgment about the content of 
international law than by the desire to find some limit—any limit—on 
the Define and Punish Clause. Panama had agreed to the American pros-
ecution of the offender, so that the case presented no risk of offense to a 
foreign government. The court apparently was troubled not by what hap-
pened in this case, but by what might happen in the next case, or in a 
prosecution under another statute. The desire to rein in the Define and 
Punish Clause cannot, by itself, justify the court’s decision, but it does 
explain the very few cases, and still fewer statutes, whose authority rests 
solely on this clause.92 For the moment, the theoretical reach of the 
clause far exceeds its actual use. 
D. “Due Process of Law” 
Despite its significance for issues of jurisdiction and choice-of-law, 
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment seldom figures in analy-
sis of the reach of federal statutes overseas. The Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment imposes restraints on the scope of state law, 
especially insofar as the state purports to act extraterritorially.93 Its coun-
terpart in the Fifth Amendment plays no such prominent role. In recent 
years, the Supreme Court has only assumed, but not decided, that the 
Fifth Amendment imposes such constraints.94 And the Court held, over a 
century ago, the power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign 
nations was not subject to the Due Process Clause insofar as it protected 
vested rights.95 Nevertheless, by analogy to state cases and to federal 
cases on personal jurisdiction, some form of minimum contacts with the 
United States might still be necessary. The analogy depends both on lim-
its on the scope of state law and on the personal jurisdiction of the feder-
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al courts, yielding the conclusion that federal law can reach outside the 
borders of this country and into the borders of another only when a case 
has sufficient contacts with the United States.96 
Decisions on the scope of state law require that a relevant part of 
the activity giving rise to the claim occurs in the state whose law is to be 
applied. The Supreme Court has taken a progressively more lenient view 
of relevance, but it has always insisted on some relevant contact. Thus in 
Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, the Court refused to allow Texas to apply 
its own law to a claim on an insurance policy where “nothing in any way 
relating to the policy sued on, or to the contracts of reinsurance, was ever 
done or required to be done in Texas.”97 In Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Hague,98 another insurance case, the plaintiff’s claim had only attenuated 
contacts with the forum. A plurality of Justices nevertheless concluded 
that the forum state could apply its own law because “a significant con-
tact or significant aggregation of contacts, creat[ed] state interests, such 
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”99 The 
Court interpreted the implications of this requirement to reach the oppo-
site conclusion in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, holding that the fo-
rum state could not apply its own law.100 In that case, Kansas sought to 
apply its own law to determine interest payments on oil and gas leases in 
other states. The Court held that, with respect to parties from out of state, 
those leases had insufficient contacts with Kansas. Forum law could be 
applied only to parties who had some relevant contact with the forum 
before suit was filed there.101 
These decisions taken together and extended to the federal govern-
ment would result in a similar limitation on federal law: the law must be 
supported by some relevant contact with the United States. The Court has 
suggested that the same principle applies to the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction by federal courts based on a federal statute or rule: the defend-
ant must have some relevant contact with the United States as a whole. 
As the plurality opinion in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro not-
ed: “For jurisdiction, a litigant may have the requisite relationship with 
the United States Government but not with the government of any indi-
vidual State.”102 Strictly speaking, no decision by the Supreme Court has 
held that the Fifth Amendment requires minimum contacts with the Unit-
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ed States, but that is partly because the standard of minimum contacts 
with the entire United States can be easily satisfied in most cases, so the 
issue rarely comes up. 
The Court has not reached the corresponding holding with respect 
to choice of federal law for an additional reason. It has invoked the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes to narrow 
their scope. As the Court has framed the presumption, “When a statute 
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”103 
This presumption derives from intertwined arguments based on separa-
tion of powers and international law, all aimed at preventing embarrass-
ment to the political branches of government that might arise from unin-
tended conflict between federal law and foreign law.104 Together, these 
considerations allow the Supreme Court to avoid the constitutional ques-
tion of the scope of federal power, and in clearer terms than a contacts 
analysis, restrain the scope of federal law. 
Only when Congress has overcome the presumption against extra-
territoriality with a clear statement does the constitutional question under 
the Fifth Amendment come up. The presumption bears a striking similar-
ity to international law, at least as seen through the eyes of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, which requires contacts with the 
United States and an overall judgment that application of American law 
is not “unreasonable.”105 The single exception in the Restatement is for 
universal jurisdiction, which does not require any contacts with the Unit-
ed States.106 The entire burden of extending the scope of domestic law in 
these cases rests on the small number of heinous crimes covered by uni-
versal jurisdiction. The Restatement includes the slave trade among 
them, recognizing the distinctive condemnation that it has received in 
international law.107 
Whether or not this exception—and the loosely framed standards 
that it qualifies—should be brought into constitutional law, these provi-
sions of the Restatement already accord with the reasons underlying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality.108 Some limits, even if not pre-
cisely specified, should restrain the scope of federal law, but not in all 
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cases. For a small number of crimes, the risk of conflict with foreign law 
remains small, especially if, like slavery and the slave trade, they are 
universally condemned by all the nations of the world. Moreover, in 
many of the federal prohibitions directed towards these activities, Con-
gress has made the extraterritorial scope of federal law clear, satisfying 
the requirements of the presumption against extraterritoriality. If any ex-
ception to a minimum contacts analysis has to be made, it has to include 
slavery and the slave trade. 
The problems arise when the prohibitions extend from slavery—
narrowly defined as the complete dominion by force of one person over 
another—to other coercive conditions of employment. The international 
conventions against slavery and trafficking have gradually made this ex-
tension, as has federal law. But the broader the prohibition—extending 
from historical slavery, to peonage, to coerced labor, and then to harsh 
conditions of employment—the weaker the case for universal jurisdic-
tion. Thus, how far the extension should go remains an open question. 
Part III considers the problems of policy, principle, and enforcement of 
this extension. 
III. SLAVERY AND LABOR RIGHTS 
A. Federal Law 
The increasing breadth of the prohibitions against slavery has a 
long history. As recounted in Part I, the Thirteenth Amendment itself 
prohibits only “slavery and involuntary servitude.” Implementing legisla-
tion soon extended this prohibition to “peonage,” and the Supreme Court, 
although otherwise skeptical, recognized that Congress could prohibit the 
“badges and incidents of slavery.”109 In the same opinion, the Court 
warned against “running the slavery argument into the ground” and actu-
ally held that the Thirteenth Amendment could not justify a prohibition 
against discrimination in public accommodations.110 Since then, howev-
er, the Thirteenth Amendment has supported civil rights legislation and 
gradually expanded prohibitions against coercive labor conditions. The 
latter are the most likely to be extended overseas. 
The last significant expansion of these laws occurred in response to 
United States v. Kozminski,111 which interpreted the statutory prohibition 
against slavery in 18 U.S.C. § 1584 to prohibit only physical coercion.112 
Congress responded with amendments to the laws against slavery and 
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trafficking to prohibit psychological coercion as well. Among these laws 
is 18 U.S.C. § 1589, which prohibits “forced labor.” This term covers 
anyone who “knowingly provides or obtains the labor or services of any 
person” by means of force, serious harm, abuse of law, threats to do any 
of the foregoing, or schemes to induce a belief that serious harm would 
follow. The statute defines the prohibited means in some detail, with an 
entire subsection elaborating on the definition of “serious harm”: 
The term “serious harm” means any harm, whether physical or non-
physical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, 
that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, 
to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the 
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or 
services in order to avoid incurring that harm.113 
The coverage of nonphysical harm supersedes the decision in Kozminski. 
It also opens up a wide range of losses, real or threatened, that can sup-
port a finding of coercion: “psychological, financial, or reputational 
harm.”114 
Related provisions in the same chapter of the criminal code make 
clear that § 1589 applies extraterritorially and supports a private right of 
action. Section 1596 grants federal courts “extra-territorial jurisdiction 
over any offense” in violation of cross-referenced sections, including 
§ 1589.115 Exactly how judicial jurisdiction relates to coverage of the 
statute, or what is called “prescriptive jurisdiction,” can become a com-
plicated issue.116 At a minimum, a federal court has subject matter juris-
diction over any claim that has a reasonable basis in federal law.117 Sec-
tion 1596 seems to accomplish something more: it constitutes a clear 
statement that overcomes the presumption against extraterritoriality. By 
operation of this section, the cross-referenced sections prohibit conduct 
in other countries so long as the defendant meets certain requirements 
establishing contacts with the United States. The defendant must be ei-
ther a national of the United States, admitted for permanent residence 
here, or found here.118 As a matter of personal jurisdiction, presence of 
the defendant in the United States is needed for any criminal prosecution 
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to go forward.119 Thus, a defendant must be found in the United States or 
brought here to be prosecuted. Expanding subject matter jurisdiction, as 
§ 1596 literally does, would accomplish nothing if it did not also expand 
prescriptive jurisdiction. The court would have jurisdiction over the 
prosecution, but the government would have nothing to prosecute. The 
more likely interpretation of the provision takes the reference to “juris-
diction” to include both “adjudicative jurisdiction”—the power of the 
court to hear the case—and “prescriptive jurisdiction”—the power exer-
cised by Congress to extend the coverage of the underlying prohibition. 
This interpretation gives content to the statute and recognizes the inti-
mate connection between these forms of jurisdiction, particularly in 
criminal cases. 
In deference to foreign nations, the statute prevents a second prose-
cution if a foreign nation has already commenced one, unless the Attor-
ney General or Deputy Attorney General certifies otherwise.120 This pro-
vision, and the reference only to “criminal jurisdiction” in § 1596, con-
trasts with the creation of a private cause of action in § 1595. The private 
cause of action also reaches violations of § 1589, but it makes no refer-
ence to extraterritorial coverage. The provision confers a civil action on 
any “individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter” and it runs 
“against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or 
by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that 
person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of 
this chapter).”121 So far as these provisions go, they override any concern 
about implying a private right of action or imposing liability on someone 
not directly engaged in employing forced labor. 
If combined with § 1596, the private action in § 1595 would reach 
all the way around the world. Although the civil remedy must be stayed 
pending the outcome of criminal proceedings, presumably foreign as 
well as domestic,122 it does not remain within the control of the Depart-
ment of Justice. Consequently, no coordination between our government 
and a foreign government restrains access to the private civil remedy. 
Only the presumption against extraterritorial coverage of federal statutes 
stands in the way of the statute as a general remedy for forced labor 
wherever it may occur. The two decisions discussed earlier in Part II.C 
rejected this conclusion,123 but could not take into account the language 
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of the statutes as they currently read because of amendments made after 
the decisions came down. If the presumption against extraterritoriality 
requires a clear statement by Congress, the fact that the statutes have to 
be read together to overcome the presumption might deprive them of the 
needed clarity to do so. Section 1596 bears on the interpretation of 
§ 1589 (and other substantive prohibitions in the same chapter), which in 
turn influences the scope of the civil remedy in § 1595. 
The purely textual aspects of this issue implicate fundamental dif-
ferences in perspective between the moral imperative of ending forced 
labor and the pragmatic need to maintain comity with other countries, the 
force of the law as it exists today and its ability to adapt to expanding 
protection of human rights, and the capability of the courts to make the 
needed adjustments and the desirability of support from the political 
branches of government. Fitful progress through a checkerboard of trea-
ties, legislation, and claims has marked the development of human rights 
over the last several decades. Who can confidently assert that the tradi-
tional evils of slavery deserve subordinate consideration and less-than-
complete remedies when weighed against countervailing policies? We 
saw in Part II how constitutional law adds another layer of uncertainty to 
this question through the indistinct limits on congressional power. Inter-
national law does much the same. In the absence of principled limits on 
what litigation can achieve, practical concerns over what it actually ac-
complishes should take priority. The next section examines those con-
cerns, both for eliminating slavery in the narrow, historical sense and 
preventing forced labor in a broader sense. 
B. International Law 
Like federal law, international law contains a variety of prohibitions 
against slavery and the slave trade. As these laws have grown progres-
sively stricter, the gap between formal prohibitions and effective en-
forcement has grown wider as well. The problem is not too little interna-
tional law, but too little enforcement. 
The Slavery Convention of 1926 codified the definition of slavery 
in the narrow sense as “the status or condition of a person over whom 
any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exer-
cised.”124 This Convention did not prohibit “forced labor” but distin-
guished it from slavery and evidently presumed that it was the lesser of 
two evils. The Convention allowed forced labor for “public purposes,” 
but signatory states had to “prevent compulsory or forced labour from 
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developing into conditions analogous to slavery.”125 The Convention did 
require signatory states “[t]o bring about, progressively and as soon as 
possible, the complete abolition of slavery in all its forms,” but left indef-
inite exactly what all those forms were.126 
The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery of 
1956 expanded the range of prohibited practices, both broadening the 
definition of slavery and making it easier to find and prosecute the core 
instances of slavery.127 Slaveholders would naturally seek to evade any 
prohibition by altering labor arrangements to slightly less apparent forms 
of coercive labor. As under American law, the substantive international 
prohibitions expanded in response to reach voluntary servitude, bonded 
labor, and peonage.128 An expanded prohibition makes it easier to detect 
and eliminate the worst forms of coerced labor, which can be prosecuted 
without proving all of the elements of traditional slavery. At the same 
time, an expanded prohibition opens the door to finding less coercive 
forms of labor to be wrong in and of themselves. 
The Supplementary Convention of 1956 takes these steps through 
an intricate definition of “Institutions and Practices Similar to Slav-
ery.”129 It has four parts, addressed respectively as “debt bondage,” 
“serfdom,” trafficking in women, and trafficking in children. Debt bond-
age corresponds to the American definition of peonage, requiring contin-
ued labor to pay off a debt that can never be satisfied. “Serfdom” binds 
the laborer to land owned by someone else. Trafficking in women, in its 
broadest form, involves the transfer of a woman “to another person for 
value received or otherwise.”130 Trafficking in children occurs when “a 
child or young person under the age of 18 years, is delivered . . . to an-
other person, whether for reward or not, with a view to the exploitation 
of the child or young person or of his labour.”131 Both forms of traffick-
ing focus on transfers by the person’s family, seeking to cut off the initial 
stage of transactions that amount to slave trading. 
A variety of other treaties prohibit trafficking in women and chil-
dren, including the White Slavery Convention of 1910.132 The most re-
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cent of these is the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.133 As the 
title of the protocol indicates, it covers all forms of trafficking with the 
special emphasis on women and children derived from two interrelated 
factors: the relative physical weakness of these victims of trafficking, 
making them less able to resist violence and coercion, and the historical 
prevalence of these forms of trafficking in the sex trade and in child la-
bor. The protocol both expands and focuses prohibitions against slavery 
and the slave trade. The protocol defines “trafficking” in very broad 
terms, making sexual exploitation equivalent to slavery and making any 
transaction with respect to children equivalent to coercion: 
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transporta-
tion, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the 
threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of 
fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulner-
ability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, 
for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a min-
imum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of 
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices 
similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; 
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended 
exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be ir-
relevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have 
been used; 
(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of 
a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be considered “traffick-
ing in persons” even if this does not involve any of the means set 
forth in subparagraph (a) of this article; 
(d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.134 
The protocol, like the conventions that preceded it, requires signatory 
countries to enact implementing legislation.135 Decisions over implemen-
tation and enforcement remain at the national level, depending on stat-
utes like the federal Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act 
of 2000.136 
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This dependence on national enforcement preserves national sover-
eignty and, with it, the comity that one nation owes another. But it also 
raises concerns over how far the extended and strengthened prohibitions 
against slavery actually go when they cross national boundaries. Federal 
law, as we have seen, defers to other nations when they have initiated 
criminal prosecutions for slavery-related activities within their territory. 
As the range of prohibited conduct increases, for example, in legislation 
enacted under the protocol, the argument for deference becomes stronger 
as well. Prostitution and child labor pose enforcement problems for every 
nation. When does trafficking related to these practices justify interven-
tion by another nation? The protocol leaves these matters for negotiation, 
and if not subject to a reservation, arbitration between signatory states.137 
The protocol exhorts states to do more in the exercise of their sovereign 
powers, but it does not provide for foreign interference when a state does 
less than what the protocol requires. 
C. Actual Effects and Pragmatic Constraints 
Working out the extraterritorial effects of legislation against slav-
ery, trafficking, and coerced labor requires a more concrete level of anal-
ysis than that offered by the formal requirements of federal law and in-
ternational law. The need for more concrete analysis leaves the opposi-
tion between human rights and national sovereignty largely unresolved. 
In fact, enforcement efforts inevitably take any attempt to resolve the 
opposition in a more pragmatic direction, concerned with how the law 
actually is enforced rather than how it is literally framed. Just the me-
chanics of litigation presuppose a significant sovereign presence in the 
vicinity of the alleged wrongful conduct. “Boots on the ground,” so to 
speak, are needed to make effective enforcement possible. Detecting 
whether or how a crime or tort was committed, assembling the parties 
and evidence necessary to bring a case, and enforcing any resulting 
judgment all require the mechanisms of local law enforcement and assur-
ances that it is not complicit in the underlying wrongs. Only by extensive 
international cooperation, or conceivably by coincidence, could all these 
elements be assembled in country outside the place of the wrong. Default 
judgments and trial in absentia might work as a formal matter, but these 
expedients result in an enforceable judgment only if power can somehow 
be acquired over the defendant and exercised over its assets. These hur-
dles to effective enforcement became apparent with the first efforts in the 
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early nineteenth century to eliminate the slave trade.138 The hegemony of 
Great Britain upon the high seas, and its determined efforts to seize 
slave-trading vessels under various national flags, eventually brought an 
end to the slave trade. Even so, British enforcement depended upon the 
agreement of other nations and succeeded only after the American Civil 
War started decades later.139 
The same hurdles have resulted in the tragic persistence of slavery 
in the modern world. Estimates place the number of slaves today in range 
of twenty to thirty-six million people, far more than the four million 
slaves who were emancipated in the United States by the Civil War and 
the Thirteenth Amendment.140 Slavery now persists in poor societies 
where it has traditionally been accepted and in remote locations where 
the rule of law is weak or corrupt, as well as in modern cities where it 
can be hidden as domestic service or voluntary prostitution.141 Long-
distance litigation over human rights abuses cannot bring these modern 
forms of slavery to an end. At most, it can give greater visibility to the 
worst abuses—of which there seems to be no shortage—and the complic-
ity of established institutions in allowing slavery to persist. Litigation 
cannot, however, be conducted at the scale or intensity that would be 
required to effectively eliminate slavery. It is one tool among others. The 
federal anti-trafficking legislation therefore relies on a variety of other 
devices: conditions on federal contracts; assistance to foreign nations; aid 
to victims of trafficking; reports, surveillance, and international coopera-
tion.142 
Against the background of these multiple options, extraterritorial 
slavery legislation looks increasingly like a legal puzzle with few real 
consequences. Like litigation as an enforcement strategy, extraterritorial 
coverage appears to have more symbolic significance than immediate 
impact. That does not make it negligible in importance, but it changes the 
dimensions along which it must be evaluated. Making a statement in fa-
vor of universal jurisdiction to eradicate slavery may become more im-
portant than following through on it by regularly exercising jurisdiction. 
The threat of enforcement, instead of standing alone, becomes a bargain-
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ing chip in negotiations in commerce and foreign relations with other 
countries and with private firms. It also figures in the assessment of en-
forcement priorities, which naturally gravitate towards the most egre-
gious forms of abuse, those most easily proved, and those with the great-
est connection to the United States. 
All of these factors typically make the problem of extraterritoriality 
less severe. The problem tends to solve itself in light of the practicalities 
of enforcement, which depend upon traditional notions of sovereignty 
and international relations. The same holds true of the two issues that 
animate many discussions of international law related to slavery in 
American courts: the existence of private rights of action and the extent 
of prohibited labor practices. Neither of these issues can be addressed in 
isolation from the wider context of optimal enforcement and prevention. 
A nuanced approach to each would keep developing law in harmony 
with overall goals. Across-the-board recognition of private actions to 
address coercive labor relations wherever they may be found in the world 
does not seem to be a promising strategy. They would leave other na-
tions, which depend less on private civil litigation, puzzling over the di-
rection of American law and policy.143 Such actions would also stretch 
enforcement resources too thinly across a range of labor practices, only 
some of which closely resemble traditional slavery. 
At the opposite extreme, denying any civil remedy at all would 
send the baffling signal that victims of slavery have suffered no legally 
compensable harm. The challenge is not to decry extravagant civil reme-
dies, or to insist on none at all, but to fashion them in a way that works 
consistently with other remedies and strategies. The current provision in 
§ 1595(b) takes a step in the right direction by staying civil actions pend-
ing the resolution of criminal proceedings.144 A further step would re-
quire notice to the Department of Justice of any such suit, with a view to 
allowing the Department to initiate criminal proceedings itself or allow-
ing a foreign country to do so. In that way, enforcement through the ex-
ecutive branch could be coordinated with civil actions. Here, as else-
where in international civil litigation, participation by the political 
branches of government can assure that foreign policy objectives do not 
get lost in the immediate incentives of parties in private litigation. 
The ultimate goal of eliminating slavery in all its forms presents a 
moving target. On the optimistic side, the range of acceptable labor prac-
tices narrowed over the course of the twentieth century. Twelve hours is 
no longer the measure of the standard working day. For similar reasons, 
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the prohibitions against slavery have expanded in both international and 
domestic law. On the pessimistic side, slavery has not stood still, but has 
adapted to escape detection and abolition. Traffickers have devised new 
means of moving migrants to countries and places where slavery can 
flourish undetected, and of moving the products of slave labor into the 
mainstream of commerce. 
Extreme destitution can lead people to choose slavery as the lesser 
of two evils for themselves and, still more tragically, for their children. 
Slavery can at least provide them with the minimal conditions for surviv-
al. Millions of people live in such dire conditions, providing ample op-
portunity for traffickers to entice them into forced labor and then hide 
them in the margins or interstices of civilized society. For this reason, 
estimates of the number of slaves in the world today vary over a wide 
range, reaching as high as twenty to thirty-six million slaves.145 Even ten 
times fewer would still be a large number in absolute terms, although in 
relative terms, the highest estimates represent only a tiny fraction of the 
approximate 7.2 billion people in the world, amounting to one half of one 
percent of the worldwide population. On any view of the numbers, slav-
ery has a great moral impact despite the small effect on ordinary labor 
and product markets. As Kevin Bales, a noted antislavery researcher and 
campaigner, explained: “[A] lot of commodities and products have a lit-
tle bit of slavery in them.”146 That calculation does not account for the 
great human cost borne by the victims of slavery, but it puts in perspec-
tive the need to focus enforcement efforts and to avoid dissipating re-
sources on reforming labor practices objectionable on other grounds, 
such as low wages and dangerous conditions of work.147 The latter re-
forms require a different agenda, different institutions, and different en-
forcement efforts. 
Just the goal of bringing the incidence of slavery down to insignifi-
cant levels, let alone eliminating it entirely, requires strategies that go 
well beyond simple changes in legal doctrine. Absolute abolition of slav-
ery probably requires a drastic reduction in world poverty. That requires 
a far more ambitious agenda than legal abolition, which has already been 
achieved in international law and in the law of virtually all the nations in 
the world. The problem is not legal doctrine but legal enforcement. Pros-
ecution of slaveholders and traffickers represents a necessary first step in 
effective abolition, but enforcement requires local efforts that go far be-
yond legal proceedings. Finding, freeing, and rehabilitating the victims 
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of slavery, and putting in place economic, political, and social structures 
that prevent them from being reenslaved must also be priorities.148 These 
steps do not make the legal issues go away, but they lead to a new appre-
ciation of how they can develop into effective enforcement, which must 
be nuanced and attentive to context. To paraphrase Eric Foner’s account 
of Lincoln’s attitude towards emancipation, it must demonstrate “the ca-
pacity for growth.”149 Cutting off any access to court also cuts off the 
capacity for growth. 
The basic challenge lies in developing a workable compromise that 
recognizes the need for legal remedies against slavery without undue 
affront to the sovereignty of foreign nations. As Kevin Bales has also 
pointed out: “Countries are touchy about sovereignty, especially coun-
tries that were once under the colonial thumb.”150 American law has 
made a start to solving this problem, as noted earlier,151 in the provision 
for staying American prosecutions and civil actions if criminal proceed-
ings have been commenced in another country more directly concerned. 
These provisions follow the terms of human rights treaties that require 
exhaustion of local remedies, forging a compromise between protecting 
human rights and recognizing territorial sovereignty.152 A compromise 
along these lines does not solve all the problems of human rights litiga-
tion, but it indicates the correct direction to take. Civil actions, in particu-
lar, might not reflect the complexities of devising foreign policy in a 
world of legally coequal sovereigns. Public prosecution, conversely, 
might devalue the individual interest in prevention and compensation. As 
David Engstrom has suggested, the choice between the two regimes of 
enforcement is not all-or-nothing.153 Combining the two regimes might 
yield better results than each one separately. 
In antislavery legislation, the federal government could be given a 
gatekeeping role to decide which private actions should go forward. If 
the government takes the heat for denying a remedy to deserving victims 
of slavery, then the resulting publicity could be used to give antislavery 
efforts a higher priority on the public agenda. If the government allowed 
the action to go forward, it would signal to foreign countries that they 
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had not done enough to stand by their international commitments. The 
scope of gatekeeping authority could also be tailored to the case’s con-
nection to the United States, so that it increased as the contacts of the 
case with this country became more attenuated. Wholly domestic cases 
could be left free of public control, while those that were entirely foreign 
would be given the greatest gatekeeping scrutiny. The pragmatic impera-
tives that limit the effective scope of even the broadest prohibition could, 
in this way, be brought to bear on decisions whether to prosecute indi-
vidual cases. The resulting patchwork of enforcement efforts might not 
be intrinsically desirable, but it is characteristic of the developing law of 
human rights. Universal declarations remain subject to the vicissitudes of 
creating and implementing actual remedies. 
CONCLUSION 
The Thirteenth Amendment does not purport to apply beyond “the 
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”154 Read with 
other clauses in the Constitution, it nevertheless gives the federal gov-
ernment nearly plenary power to address the international dimensions of 
slavery. This power has roots that go back to the beginning of the Repub-
lic, as do the evils of slavery itself. There is no need to read the geo-
graphical restrictions out of the self-enforcing provisions of the Thir-
teenth Amendment to reach the conclusion that they do not encumber 
independent powers conferred on the federal government. 
What is far more difficult is to read the established territorial limits 
on the power of the modern nation-state out of federal legislation and 
federal enforcement efforts. The modern history of international human 
rights has revealed how episodic the erosion of these limits has been. A 
snapshot of the current state of the law presents a puzzling pattern of 
prohibitions and remedies of different scope. A look at trends in the law 
does not make the picture any simpler, but complicates it by taking the 
analysis back through different historical eras. Gradual and uneven 
though the trends may be, it has favored expansion of coverage and ex-
pansion of remedies. Fulfilling the promise of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, beyond its literal terms, requires that there is no going back. 
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